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Abstract. In allocation problems, a given set of goods are assigned to agents in
such a way that the social welfare is maximised, that is, the largest possible global
worth is achieved. When goods are indivisible, it is possible to use money com-
pensation to perform a fair allocation taking into account the actual contribution
of all agents to the social welfare. Coalitional games provide a formal mathe-
matical framework to model such problems, in particular the Shapley value is a
solution concept widely used for assigning worths to agents in a fair way. Unfor-
tunately, computing this value is a #P-hard problem, so that applying this good
theoretical notion is often quite difficult in real-world problems.
We describe useful properties that allow us to greatly simplify the instances of
allocation problems, without affecting the Shapley value of any player. More-
over, we propose algorithms for computing lower bounds and upper bounds of
the Shapley value, which in some cases provide the exact result and that can be
combined with approximation algorithms.
The proposed techniques have been implemented and tested on a real-world ap-
plication of allocation problems, namely, the Italian research assessment pro-
gram, known as VQR. For the large university considered in the experiments,
the problem involves thousands of agents and goods (here, researchers and their
research products). The algorithms described in the paper are able to compute the
Shapley value for most of those agents, and to get a good approximation of the
Shapley value for all of them.
Keywords: Coalitional games; Allocation problems; Game theory; Shapley value com-
putation; Approximation algorithms; Research assessment exercises
1 Introduction
1.1 Coalitional Game Theory
Coalitional games provide a rich mathematical framework to analyze interactions be-
tween intelligent agents. We consider coalitional games of the form G = 〈N, v〉, con-
sisting of a set N of n agents and a characteristic function v. The latter maps each
coalition C ⊆ N to the worth that agents in C can obtain by collaborating with each
other. In this context, the crucial problem is to find a mechanism to allocate the worth
v(N), i.e., the value of the grand-coalitionN , in a way that is fair for all players and that
additionally satisfies some further important properties such as efficiency: we distribute
precisely the available budget v(N) to players (not more and not less). Moreover, for
fairness and stability reasons, it is usually required that every group of agents C gets at
least the worth v(C) that it can guarantee to the game.
Several solution concepts have been considered in the literature as “fair allocation”
schemes and, among them, a prominent one is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). Ac-
cording to this notion, the worth of any agent i is determined by considering its actual
contribution to all the possible coalitions of agents. More precisely, it is considered the
so-called marginal contribution to any coalition C, that is, the difference between what
can be obtained when i collaborates with the agents in C and what can be obtained
without the contribution of i. More formally, the Shapley value of a player i ∈ N is
defined by the following weighted average of all such marginal contributions:
φi(G) =
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|!(n− |C| − 1)!
n!
(
v(C ∪ {i})− v(C)
)
.
1.2 Allocation Games
Among the various classes of coalitional games, we focus in this paper on allocation
games, which is a setting for analyzing fair division problems where monetary com-
pensations are allowed and utilities are quasi-linear (Moulin, 1992). Allocation games
naturally arise in various application domains, ranging from house allocation to room
assignment-rent division, to (cooperative) scheduling and task allocation, to protocols
for wireless communication networks, and to queuing problems (see, e.g., (Greco &
Scarcello, 2014b; Iera, Militano, Romeo, & Scarcello, 2011; Maniquet, 2003; Mishra
& Rangarajan, 2007; Moulin, 1992) and the references therein).
Computing the Shapley value of such games is a difficult problem, indeed it is
#P-hard even if goods can only have two different possible values (Greco, Lupia, &
Scarcello, 2015). In this paper we focus on large instances of this problem, involving
thousands of agents and goods, for which no algorithm described in the literature is
able to provide an exact solution. There are however some promising recent advances
that identify islands of tractability for the allocation problems where at most one good
is allocated to each agent: it has been recently shown that those instances where the
treewidth of the agents’ interaction-graph is bounded by some constant (i.e., have a low
degree of cyclicity) can be solved in polynomial-time (Greco et al., 2015). The result is
based on recent advances on counting solutions of conjunctive queries with existential
variables (Greco & Scarcello, 2014a). Unfortunately, if the structure is quite cyclic this
technique cannot be applied to large instances, because its computational complexity
has an exponential dependency on the treewidth.
In some applications, one can be satisfied with approximations of the Shapley value.
With this respect, things are quite good in principle, since we know there exists a fully
polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme to compute the Shapley value in
supermodular games (Liben-Nowell, Sharp, Wexler, & Woods, 2012). The algorithm
can thus be tuned to obtain the desired maximum expected error, as a percentage of the
correct Shapley value. However, not very surprisingly, for very large instances one has
to consider a huge number of samples, in order to stay below a reasonable expected
error. Maleki et al. (Maleki, Tran-Thanh, Hines, Rahwan, & Rogers, 2013) provide
bounds for the estimation error (as an absolute number rather than a percentage of the
correct value) if the variance or the range of the samples are known. They also introduce
stratified sampling as a method to further reduce the number of required samples.
1.3 Contribution
In order to attack large instances of allocation problems, we start by proving some
useful properties of these problems that allow us to decompose instances into smaller
pieces, which can be solved independently. Moreover, some of these properties identify
cases where the computation of the worth function can be obtained in a very efficient
way.
With these properties, we are able to use the randomized approximation algorithm
of Liben-Nowell et al. (Liben-Nowell et al., 2012) even on instances that (when not
decomposed) are very large.
Furthermore, we note that in some applications one may prefer to determine a guar-
anteed interval for the Shapley value, rather than one probably good point. Therefore,
we propose algorithms for computing a lower bound and an upper bound of the Shap-
ley value for allocation problems. In many cases the distance between the two bounds
is quite small, and sometimes they even coincide, which means that we actually com-
puted the exact value. We also used these algorithms together with the approximation
algorithm of Liben-Nowell et al. (Liben-Nowell et al., 2012), to provide a more accu-
rate evaluation of the maximum error of this randomized solution, for the considered
instances.
Moreover, by plugging the computed lower bound values into the randomized sam-
pling algorithm proposed by Maleki et al. (Maleki et al., 2013), we were able to express
their error bound as a percentage of the correct Shapley value, rather than as an absolute
number, at least for our test instances. This allowed us to compute approximate Shapley
values for our largest test case (namely, the 2011-2014 research assessment exercise of
Sapienza University of Rome), within 5% of the correct value with 99% probability, in
a matter of hours.
1.4 The Case Study
We have tested the proposed techniques on large real-world instances of the VQR2011-
2014 Italian research assessment exercise. This exercise requires every Italian research
structure R to select some research products, and submit them to an evaluation agency
called ANVUR. While doing so, the structure R is in competition with all other Ital-
ian research structures, as the outcome of the evaluation will be used to proportionally
transfer the funds allocated by the Ministry to support research activities in the next
years (until the subsequent evaluation process). Every structure R is therefore inter-
ested in selecting and submitting its best research products. For the sake of simplicity,
we next simply speak of publications instead of research products (which can also be
patents, books, etc.), and of universities and departments instead of structures and sub-
structures (which can be other research subjects). The programme is articulated in two
phases: (1) Based on authors’ self-evaluations and on ANVUR guidelines, R selects
and submits to ANVUR (at most) two publications for each one of its authors4, in such
a way that any product is formally associated with at most one author. (2) ANVUR for-
mulates its independent quality judgment about the submitted publications (the score
assigned to each publication is currently made known only to its authors), and the sum
of the scores resulting from ANVUR’s evaluation is then the VQR score of R. Eventu-
ally, R will receive funds in subsequent years proportional to this score. Furthermore,
ANVUR also published an evaluation of all departments, based on the product scores
(the score of each department was computed as the sum of the scores of the prod-
ucts formally assigned to the authors in that department). Finally, the scores were also
used for evaluating individual researchers that had been recently hired by R (this also
greatly influencedR’s funds in subsequent years), as well as those researchers that were
members of PhD committees. Scores for recently hired researchers were computed as
the sum of the scores of the products formally assigned to them; data in this respect
were published by ANVUR in aggregated form only, for each department and for each
scientific disciplinary sector. Evaluations for researchers that were members of PhD
committees were computed as the sum of the scores of the best publications each one
of them had coauthored, among all the publications submitted for the VQR (for this
evaluation, the formal assignment of publications to authors was irrelevant); data in this
respect were published by ANVUR in aggregated form only, for each PhD committee.
The way ANVUR currently uses product scores, for the purposes described above,
yields evaluations that do not satisfy the desirable properties outlined in Section 4. In or-
der to deal with this issue, we have modeled the problem as an allocation game (Greco
& Scarcello, 2013), with a fair way to divide the total score of the university among
researchers, groups, and departments based on the Shapley value. The proposed divi-
sion rule enjoys many desirable properties, such as the independence of the specific
allocation of research products, the independence of the preliminary (optimal) products
selection, the guarantee of the actual (marginal) contribution, and so on.
2 Preliminaries
In the setting considered in this paper, a game is defined by an allocation scenario
A = 〈N,G, Ω, val, k〉 comprising a set of agents N and a set of goods G, whose
values are given by the function valmapping each good to a non-negative real number.
4 There are exceptions to this rule: in specific circumstances, fewer than two publications are
expected for some authors. To our ends, this detail is immaterial.
The function Ω associates each agent with the set of goods he/she is interested in.
Moreover, the natural number k provides the maximum number of goods that can be
assigned to each agent. Each good is indivisible and can be assigned at most to one
player.
For a coalition C ⊆ N , a (feasible) allocation πA[C] is a mapping from C to sets
of goods from G such that: each agent i ∈ C gets a set of goods πA(i) ⊆ Ω(i) with
|πA(i)| ≤ k, and πA(i) ∩ πA(j) = ∅, for any other agent j ∈ C (each good can be
assigned to one agent at most).
We denote by img(πA[C]) the set of all goods in the image of πA[C], that is,
img(πA[C]) =
⋃
i∈C πA[C](i). With a slight abuse of notation, we denote by val(S)
the sum of all the values of a set of goods S ⊆ G, and by val(πA[C]) the value
val(img(πA[C])). An allocation πA[C] is optimal if there exists no allocation π
′
A[C]
with val(π′A[C]) > val(πA[C]). The total value of such an optimal allocation for
the coalition C is denoted by optA(C). The budget available for A, also called the
(maximum) social welfare, is optA(N), that is, the value of any optimal allocation for
the whole set of agents N (the grand-coalition). The coalitional game defined by the
scenario A is the pair 〈N, optA〉, that is, the game where the worth of any coalition
is given by the value of any of its optimal allocations. Note that optA(C) ≥ 0 holds,
for each C ⊆ N , since the allocation where no agent receives any goods is a feasible
one (the value of an empty set of goods is 0). The definition trivializes for C = ∅, with
optA(∅) = 0.
g1 g2 g3 g4
a1 a2 a3
3 2 1 1
a1 a2
3 2 1 1
a1 a3
3 2 1 1
a2 a3
3 2 1 1
a1
3 2 1 1
a2
3 2 1 1
a3
3 2 1 1
Fig. 1: Allocation scenario A0 in Example 1.
Example 1. Consider the allocation scenarioA0 = 〈{a1, a2, a3}, {g1, g2, g3, g4}, Ω, val, 1〉,
depicted in a graphical way in Figure 1, where each edge connects an agent to a good
she is interested in, and it is possible to allocate just one good to each agent (k = 1).
The figure shows on the left an allocation for all the agents, with the edges in bold iden-
tifying the allocation of goods to agents. Note that this is an optimal allocation, i.e., a
feasible allocation whose sum of values of the allocated goods is the maximum possible
one. The value of this allocation is val(g1) + val(g2) + val(g3) = 3 + 2 + 1 = 6.
The coalitional game associated with this scenario is GA0 = 〈{a1, a2, a3}, vA0〉,
where the worth function vA0 is precisely optA0 . In particular, we have seen that, for
the grand-coalition, vA0({a1, a2, a3}) = 6 holds. For eachC ⊂ {a1, a2, a3} with C 6=
∅, an optimal allocation restricted to the agents in C is also reported in Figure 1. It fol-
lows that the other values of the worth function are vA0({a1, a2}) = 5, vA0({a1, a3})
= vA0({a2, a3}) = 4, vA0 ({a1}) = vA0({a2}) = 3, and vA0({a3}) = 1. ✁
For any allocation scenario A = 〈N,G, Ω, val, k〉, we define the agents graph as
the undirected graph G(A) = (N,E) such that {i, j} ∈ E if there is a good g ∈
Ω(i) ∩Ω(j).
3 The VQR Allocation Game
Note that the VQR research assessment exercise can be naturally modeled as an alloca-
tion scenario A = 〈R,P , products , val, 2〉 whereR is the set of researchers affiliated
with a certain university R, P is the set of publications selected by R for the assess-
ment exercise, products maps authors to the set of publications they have written, and
val assigns a value to each publication. In the current VQR programme (covering years
2011-2014), the range of val is {0, 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, 1}, with the latter value reserved to the
excellent products.
In the submission phase, the values are estimated by the universities according to
authors’ self-evaluations, and to the reference tables published by ANVUR (not avail-
able for some research areas). At the end of the program, R will receive an amount of
funds proportional to VR = val(P), that is, to the considered measure of the quality
of the research produced by the universityR. The first combinatorial problem, which is
easily seen to be a weighted matching problem, is to identify the best allocation scenario
for the university. That is, to select a set of publications P to be submitted, having the
maximum possible total value among all those authored byR in the considered period.
The final result may sometimes be different from the preliminary estimate, in par-
ticular because of those publications that undergo a peer-review process by experts
selected by ANVUR, which clearly introduces a subjective factor in the evaluation.
We assume that the values used by R in the preliminary phase do coincide with the
final ANVUR evaluation for all products. This is actually immaterial for the purpose
of this paper, because we are interested here in the final division, where only the final
(ANVUR) evaluation matters. However, we recall for the sake of completeness that, by
adopting the fair division rule used in this paper, the best choice for all researchers is
to provide their most accurate evaluation, so that R is able to submit any optimal se-
lection of products to ANVUR. In particular, any strategically incorrect self-evaluation
by any researcher is useless, in that it cannot lead to any improvement in her/his per-
sonal evaluation, while it can lead to a worse evaluation if the best total value for R is
missed (Greco & Scarcello, 2013).
Example 2. Let us consider the weighted bipartite graph in Figure 2, whose vertices
are the researchers R = {r1, r2, r3} of a university R and all the publications they
have written. Edges encode the authorship relation products , and weights encode the
mapping val providing the values of the publications. Consider the optimal allocation
ψ such thatψ(r1) = {p1, p3},ψ(r2) = {p2, p4}, andψ(r3) = {p6, p7}, encoded by the
solid lines in the figure. Based on this allocation, an optimal selection of publications to
be submitted for the evaluation is Pψ = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p6, p7}. The publications that
7 10 67 78
r1 r2 r3
p2 p3 p4 p5 p6 p7
76
p8p1
Fig. 2: Authors and products in Example 2.
are not submitted are shown in black in the figure. Note that p2 is co-authored by r1,
r2, and r3, while p3 is co-authored by r1 and r2. Thus, the allocation scenario to be
considered is A = 〈R,Pψ, products , val, 2〉, and the associated coalitional game is
the pair 〈R, opt(R)〉. In particular, the total value of the grand-coalition is opt(R) =
45. ✁
The problem that we face is how to compute, from the total value obtained by R, a
fair score for individual researchers, or groups, or departments, and so on. As mentioned
above, product scores are currently used for evaluating the hiring policy of universities
and the PhD committees, and from this year such scores contribute to evaluate the qual-
ity of courses of study, too. Unfortunately, this is currently done in a way that fails
to satisfy the properties that we outline below. Instead, following (Greco & Scarcello,
2013), we propose to use the Shapley value of the allocation game defined by the sce-
nario selected by the given structure R as the division rule to distribute the available
total value (or budget) to all the participating agents. For the allocation scenario in Ex-
ample 2, we get φr1 =
29
2 , φr2 =
29
2 , and φr3 = 16. Notice that the Shapley value is not
a percentage assignment of publications to authors, but takes into account all possible
coalitions of agents. Note that r3 is not penalized by the fact that its best publication
p2 is assigned to researcher r2, in the submission phase determined by the optimal al-
location depicted in Figure 2. Similarly, r1 is not penalized by the fact that the worst
publication p3 is assigned to her/him (instead of being assigned to r2).
Another important property is that the value assigned to each researcher is inde-
pendent by the specific selection of products to be submitted, as long as the sub-
mission is an optimal one. For instance, an equivalent selection would consist of the
products Pψ′ = {p1, p2, p4, p5, p6, p7}, because of the optimal allocation ψ′ such that
ψ′(r1) = {p1, p2}, ψ′(r2) = {p4, p5}, and ψ′(r3) = {p6, p7}. It can be checked that
no Shapley value changes for any researcher, by considering the alternative allocation
scenario A′ = 〈R,Pψ′ , products , val, 2〉 based on the selection of products Pψ′ . On
the other hand this nice property does not hold for many division rules. For instance,
assume that the value of each researcher is determined by the average score of all the
products evaluated by ANVUR of which she is a (co-)author5. Then, in the former al-
5 The products that were not submitted cannot be used, because they miss a certified evaluation
by ANVUR.
location scenario r1 gets 23/3, while in the latter one she gets 17/2. Symmetrically, r2
gets a higher value in the former scenario and a lower one in the latter.
We will now recall the main desirable properties enjoyed by the division rule based
on the Shapley value used in this paper. We refer the interested reader to (Greco &
Scarcello, 2013) for a more detailed description and discussion of these properties.
Budget-balance. The division rule precisely distributes the VQR score of R over
all its members, i.e.,
∑
r∈R φr = VR.
Fairness. The division rule is indifferent w.r.t. the specific optimal allocation used
to submit the products to ANVUR. In particular, the score of each researcher is inde-
pendent of the particular products assigned to him in the submission phase; moreover,
it is independent of the specific set of products P selected by the university, as long as
the choice is optimal (i.e., with the same maximum value VR).
Marginality. For any group of researchers S ⊆ R, φS ≥ marg(S,R), where
φS =
∑
i∈φS
φi and marg(S,R) = opt(R) − opt(R \ S). That is, every group is
granted at least its marginal contribution to the performance of the grand-coalitionR.
We remark the importance of the fairness property, as the choice of a specific op-
timal set of products is immaterial for R, but it may lead to quite different scores for
individuals (and for their aggregations, assume e.g. that researchers r1 and r2 above
belong to different departments). As a matter of fact, this property does not hold for the
division rules adopted by ANVUR for the evaluation of both departments and newly
hired researchers (see Section 1.4). The budget-balance property, on the other hand,
is violated by the division rule for evaluating researchers who are members of PhD
committees.
4 Useful Properties for Dealing with Large Instances
Recall that computing the Shapley value is #P-hard for many classes of games (see,
e.g., (Aziz & de Keijzer, 2014; Bachrach & Rosenschein, 2009; Deng & Papadimitriou,
1994; Nagamochi, Zeng, Kabutoya, & Ibaraki, 1997)), including the allocation games,
even if goods may have only two possible values (Greco & Scarcello, 2014b).
For large instances, a brute-force approach is unfeasible, because to compute the
value of each agent i ∈ N , it would need to solve 2n optimization problems, where
n = |N | is the number of agents. This is particularly true in our case study, where n is
in the order of thousands.
In order to mitigate the complexity of this problem, in this section we will describe
some useful properties of the Shapley value, in particular for allocation problems, which
allow us to simplify the instances in a preprocessing phase.
Let us consider in this section an allocation scenario A = 〈N,G, Ω, val, k〉, with
G = 〈N, v〉 denoting its associated game, whose agents graph is G = (N,E). For such
scenario we show the following properties which allow us to simplify the game at hand
without altering the Shapley value of any player:Modularity, Null goods, Separability,
Disconnected agent.
Theorem 1 (Modularity). Let {C1, C2} be a partition of agents ofN such thatΩ(i)∩
Ω(j) = ∅, for every pair of agents i, j with i ∈ C1 and j ∈ C2. Let G1 = 〈C1, v1〉
(resp., G2 = 〈C2, v2〉) be the coalitional game restricted to agents in C1 (resp., C2).
Then, for each agent i ∈ N , φi(G) = φi(G1) + φi(G2).
Proof. Let G′1 = 〈N, v
′
1〉 and G
′
2 = 〈N, v
′
2〉 be two coalitional games such that, for
each C ⊆ N , v′1(C) = v1(C ∩ C1) and v
′
2(C) = v2(C ∩ C2). Contrasted with the
games in the statement, these games are defined over the full set of agentsN .
Since there are no interactions between agents in C1 and agents in C2, the total
value of the optimal allocation for any coalition C is given by the sum of the values
of the goods in the optimal allocations restricted to the two sets of agents C ∩ C1 and
C ∩C2. Therefore, we have v(C) = v′1(C)+v
′
2(C). Then, from the additivity property
of the Shapley value, for each agent i ∈ N , φi(G) = φi(G′1) + φi(G
′
2).
Consider now the games G1 = 〈C1, v1〉 and G2 = 〈C2, v2〉) restricted to agents in
C1 and in C2, respectively. Note that each player j ∈ N \ C1 is dummy with respect to
the game G′1, so that her Shapley value is null, and her presence have no actual impact
on any other player inG′1. In particular such dummy agents could be removed from the
game without changing the Shapley value of the other agents, so that for every i ∈ C1,
we have svi(G
′
1) = svi(G1) and the result immediately follows (by using the same
reasoning forG2).
From the above fact, it follows immediately that each connected component of the
agents graph can treated as a separate coalitional game.
Corollary 1. Let Z be any connected component of the agents graph. The coalitional
game GZ = 〈Z, vZ〉 associated with the allocation scenario obtained by restricting A
to the players in Z is such that the Shapley value of each player in Z is the same as in
the full game associated with A.
It easy to see that goods having value 0 do not impact on the computation of the
optimal allocation. However, the existence of shared null goods betweenmultiple agents
induces connections (among agents) which complicates the structure of the graph.
For instance, consider an allocation scenarioA′ comprising three agents {r1, r2, r3}
having a joint interest only for one good, say g0, whose value is 0. Any other good has
just a single agent interested in it. In such a scenario, Corollary 1 cannot be used, since
the agents graph associated with the scenarioA′ consists of one connected component.
On the other hand, without g0, the agents graph would be completely disconnected
and thus it would be possible to compute the Shapley values immediately, by using
Corollary 1. The following fact states that, in fact, we can get rid of such null goods.
Fact 2 (No shared null goods) By removing all goods having value 0 from G, we get
an allocation scenario with the same associated allocation game.
Proof. Just observe that in the computation of the marginal contribution of any agent i
to a coalition C, there is no advantage for agents in C in using a good in Ω(i) having
value 0.
If it is useful in the algorithms, we can also use Fact 2 in the opposite way, and add
null-value goods. Let g be a good with val(g) = 0 and let X = {a ∈ N | g ∈ Ω(a)}
be the set of agents that are interested in having g. Then, the game associated with A
is the same as the game associated with the allocation scenario where g is replaced
by fresh goods g1, . . . g|X| such that each of them is of interest to just one agent in X
(hence, there are no connections in the graph because of such goods).
The following property provides us with a powerful simplification method for al-
location games. Intuitively, the property states that any set of agents Z that does not
exhibit an effective synergy with the rest of the agents can be removed from the game
and solved separately.
Theorem 3 (Separability). Let Z be any coalition such that opt(Z) + opt(N \Z) ≤
opt(N). Then, we can define from the allocation scenario A two disjoint allocation
scenarios restricted to agents Z andN \Z , respectively, that can be solved separately.
For each player i ∈ N , we can compute its Shapley value in the game associated with
A by considering only the game associated with the restricted scenario where i occurs.
Proof. Denote N \ Z by Z¯, and consider the allocation games G1 = 〈Z, v1〉 and G2 =
〈Z¯, v2〉 restricted to agents in Z and Z¯, respectively.
Preliminary observe that, for each pair of disjoint coalitionsC′, C′′ ⊆ N , opt(C′)+
opt(C′′) ≥ opt(C′ ∪ C′′) holds. Indeed, given any optimal allocation for the agents
in C′ ∪ C′′, its restriction to C′ is a feasible allocation for C′, as well as its restric-
tion to C′′ is a feasible allocation for C′′. In particular, we have opt(Z) + opt(Z¯) ≥
opt(N) that, combined with the hypothesis about the considered coalition Z , entails
that opt(Z) + opt(Z¯) = opt(N). This means that the values of the goods not used in
any optimal allocation for Z¯ is equal to the sum of the values of the best goods for the
agents in Z .
We shall show that, for each optimal allocation π forN , the set of goods S ⊆ Ω(Z)
allocated by π to Z is such that val(S) = opt(Z) and the analogous property holds
for Z¯ . Therefore, these agents get the best goods they can obtain. To prove this claim,
consider the value v = val(S) ≤ opt(Z) and the value v¯ ≤ opt(Z¯). We know that
opt(Z)+opt(N \Z) = opt(N) and, by the optimality of π, it holds v+ v¯ = opt(N)
too.
Consider now any coalition C ⊆ N , and let Ca = C ∩ Z and Cb = C ∩ Z¯. Let π′
be an optimal allocation for C. We claim that there is an optimal allocation πa mapping
goods from S to Z with valpia(Ca) = valpi′(Ca), and an optimal allocation πb map-
ping goods not in S to Z¯ with valpib(Cb) = valpi′(Cb). Assume by contradiction that
this is not the case. Then at least one of those allocations lead to values smaller than
those in π′ (note that π′ cannot be worse, because the union of the two restricted allo-
cations is a valid candidate mapping for C). Assume Ca gets a smaller total value (the
other case is symmetrical), that is, valpia(Ca) < valpi′(Ca). Then, there exists some
agent i and a good p /∈ S so that p ∈ π′(i). By using Theorem 4.4 in (Greco & Scar-
cello, 2014b), we can show that this would contradict the fact that val(S) = opt(Z).
In fact, goods such as p that are shared with agents outside Z and that allows us to get
a better value for the agents in Ca ⊆ Z , could be used to improve the choice of the
available goods S for the full set Z .
Now, given that it suffices to use only the goods in S for Z and the remaining goods
for Z¯ , we can define an equivalent game in which the goods in S are of interest to agents
in Z only and the remaining to agents in Z¯ only. In the new game, Z and Z¯ are in fact
sets of agents with no shared connections and the theorem follows immediately from
Theorem 1.
A very frequent and important case in applications, which falls in the case consid-
ered by this latter property, occurs when C is a singleton {i}, and it happens that the
optimal allocation for this coalition is equal to the marginal contribution of i toN \{i}.
By using the property described above, the set i can be removed from the game and
solved separately, so that we immediately get φ(i) = opt({i}).
The following property identifies some goods that are useless for some agent i and
thus can be safely removed from its set of relevant goodsΩ(i). Note that this operation
does not affect other agents possibly interested in such goods.
Fact 4 (Useless goods) Let i ∈ N be an agent, and let g ∈ Ω(i) be a good such
that val(g) +maxg′∈Ω(i)\{g} val(g
′) < marg({i}, N). Then, the modified allocation
scenario where g is removed fromΩ(i) is equivalent to the original one, that is, the two
scenarios have the same associated game.
We conclude this section with a simple property that does not help to simplify the
game, but allows us to avoid the computation of unnecessary optimal allocations, during
the computation of marginal contributions.
Fact 5 (Disconnected agent) Let i ∈ N be an agent and let C ⊆ N be a component
disconnected from i, that is, such thatΩ(i)∩Ω(j) = ∅, for each j ∈ C. Then, opt({i}∪
C) = opt({i}) + opt(C) holds and the marginal contribution of i to C is opt({i}).
5 Lower and Upper Bounds for the Shapley Value
In this section we describe the computation of a lower bound and an upper bound for
the Shapley value of any given allocation game GA = 〈N, vA〉. The availability of
such bounds can be helpful to provide a more accurate estimation of the approximation
error in randomized algorithms. Moreover, whenever the two bounds coincide for some
agent, we clearly get the precise Shapley value for that agent. We shall see that this
often occurs in practice, in our case study.
Preliminarily observe that in allocation games we have for free a simple pair of
bounds. Indeed, recall that the anti-monotonicity property holds, so that, for each pair
of coalitions C1 ⊆ C2, marg({i}, C2) ≤ marg({i}, C1). Then, for each player i
and for every coalition C ⊆ N \ {i}, we have marg({i}, N) ≤ marg({i}, C) ≤
marg({i}, ∅) = opt({i}). It immediately follows that
marg({i}, N) ≤ φi ≤ opt({i}).
To obtain tighter bounds we observe that the neighbors of i in a coalition C are
the agents having the higher influence on the marginal contribution of i to C. Indeed,
they are precisely those agents interested in using the goods of i when he/she does not
belong to the coalition. We already observed that, in the extreme case that no neighbors
are present, i contributes with all her/his best goods. The idea is to consider the power-
set of Neigh(i) as the only relevant sets of agents.
Let P ′ be a set of neighbors of i, andC = N \(Neigh(i)∪{i}) For the computation
of the lower bound in Algorithm 1, for such a profile P ′ we compute the marginal
contribution of i to C ∪ P ′, but use this same value for the marginal contributions of i
to every coalition C′ ⊆ N such that C′ ∩ Neigh(i) = P ′, that is, for every coalition
with the same configuration P ′ of neighbors of i. Furthermore, we use a suitable factor
y to weigh this value in order to simulate that every such a coalition C′ gets that same
marginal contribution from i.
The case of the upper bound is obtained in the dual way, by using instead the most
favorable case where we use the marginal contribution of i to P ′ in place of the marginal
contribution of i to any coalition C′ ⊆ N with C′ ∩Neigh(i) = P ′.
Algorithm 1 Computing Bounds for the Shapley Value in Allocation Games
Input: An allocation game GA = 〈N, vA〉;
Output: A pair of vectors (LB,UB) encoding, respectively, a lower bound and an upper bound
of the Shapley value of GA;
1: for all i ∈ N do
2: P := Powerset(Neigh(i));
3: C := N \ (Neigh(i) ∪ {i});
4: l = |C|;
5: for all P ′ ∈ P do
6: Z := Neigh(i) \ P ′;
7: y =
∑l
k=0
(l−k+|P ′|)!·(|Z|+k)!
|N|!
·
(
l
k
)
;
8: LBi += y · (vA(C ∪ P
′ ∪ {i}) − vA(C ∪ P
′));
9: UBi += y · (vA(P
′ ∪ {i}) − vA(P
′));
10: end for
11: end for
12: return (LB,UB);
Theorem 6. Let (LB,UB) be the output of Algorithm 1. For each agent i ∈ N ,
LBi ≤ φ(i) ≤ UBi holds, and the computation of such values can be done in time
O(2|Neigh(i)||N |3).
Proof. Let i be an agent of the game. The algorithm is based on the computation of any
possible combination P ′ of the neighbors of i. Regarding the computation of the lower
bound, for each such profile P ′, the algorithm considers a coalition C ∪P ′ obtained by
completing P ′ with all the other agents in N \ {i} that are not neighbors of i.
The algorithm uses the value of the marginal contribution of i to such coalition,
that is, the value δ = vA(C ∪ P ′ ∪ {i}) − vA(C ∪ P ′), in place of the marginal
contributions of i to each coalitionC′ ⊆ N such thatC′∩Neigh(i) = P ′. Now, because
C′ ⊆ C, by exploiting the anti-monotonicity property of the marginal contributions
in allocation games, we get immediately marg({i}, C) ≤ marg({i}, C′). Then, the
algorithm weighs in a suitable way δ so that this value is used in place of the right
marginal contribution (not lower than δ) of i to each coalition C′ of the form described
above. A simple combinatorial argument shows that this can be achieved by multiplying
δ by the following factor
y =
l∑
k=0
(l − k + |P ′|)! · (|Z|+ k)!
|N |!
·
(
l
k
)
, (1)
where l = |N \ (Neigh(i) ∪ {i})| and Z = Neigh(i) \ P ′.
Regarding the computation of the upper bound of the Shapley value of i, we proceed
in a similar way but using the marginal contribution of i to the profileP ′ containing only
its neighbors, instead of the marginal contributions to the various coalitions C′ ⊆ N
such that C′ ∩ Neigh(i) = P ′. Indeed, in this case we have P ′ ⊆ C′ and therefore
marg({i}, C′) ≤ marg({i}, P ′). Again, we need to multiply such value by a factor
which takes into account of all possible ways of completing P ′ to any coalition C′ with
the same profile of i’s neighbors. It is easy to see that we can again use the factor y
described above, by exploiting the fact that
(
l
k
)
=
(
l
l−k
)
.
Concerning the computational complexity, just observe that, for each element P ′ of
the power set of Neigh(i), we have to solve a constant number of optimal allocation
problems. Each of these problems requires the computation of an optimal weighted
matching, which can be solved in time O(|N |3).
6 Approximating the Shapley Value
6.1 FPRAS for Supermodular and Monotone Coalitional Games
In order to approximate the Shapley value, one possibility is to use the Fully Polynomial-
time Randomized Approximation Scheme (FPRAS) proposed in (Liben-Nowell et al.,
2012): for any ǫ > 0 and δ > 0, it is possible to compute in polynomial-time an
ǫ−approximation of the Shapley value with probability of failure at most δ. The tech-
nique works for supermodular and monotone coalitional games, and it can be shown
that our allocation games indeed meet these properties (Greco & Scarcello, 2014b).
The method is based on generating a certain number of permutations (of all agents)
and computing the marginal contribution of each agent to the coalition of agents occur-
ring before her (him) in the considered permutation. Then the Shapley value of each
player is computed as the average of all such marginal contributions. The above proce-
dure is repeated O(log(1/δ)) times, in indepedent runs, with the result for each agent
consisting of the median of all computed values for her (him). Finally, the obtained val-
ues are scaled (i.e., they are all multiplied by a common numerical factor) to ensure that
the budget-balance property is not violated.
Clearly enough, the more permutations are considered, the closer to the Shapley
value the result will be.We next report a slightly modified version of the basic procedure
of this algorithm, where we avoid the computation of some marginal contributions, if
we can obtain the result by using Fact 5.
As a preliminary step, we compute the required number of permutationsm to meet
the required error guarantee. In each of them iterations, the algorithm generates a ran-
dom permutation from the set of agents N . We then iterate through this permutation
and compute the marginal contribution of each agent j to the set of agents C occurring
Algorithm 2 Shapley value approximation in allocation games
Input: An allocation game GA = 〈N, vA〉;
Parameters: Real numbers 0 < ǫ < 1 and 0 < δ < 1;
Output:A vector φ˜ that is an ǫ-approximation of the Shapley value of GA, with probability 1−δ;
1: m = |N|·(|N|−1)
δ·ǫ2
;
2: i = 0;
3: while i < m do
4: shuffle(N);
5: C := {∅};
6: for all j ∈ N do
7: if Neigh(j) ∩ C 6= ∅ then
8: φ˜j += vA(C ∪ {j}) − vA(C);
9: else
10: φ˜j += vA({j});
11: end if
12: C := C ∪ {j};
13: i = i+ 1;
14: end for
15: end while
16: for all j ∈ N do
17: φ˜j =
φ˜j
m
;
18: end for
19: return φ˜;
before j in the permutation at hand. If some neighbor of j (in the agents graph) occurs
in C, the algorithm proceeds as usual by computing the value of an optimal allocation
for C ∪{j} in order to obtain the value vA(C ∪{j}). Note indeed that this one compu-
tation is sufficient to get such a marginal contribution, because the value opt(C) for the
coalition C including the preceding agents (for the permutation at hand) is known from
the previous step. Moreover, by Fact 5, we know that for those permutations in which
all the players in Neigh(j) follow j, the marginal contribution of j is just opt({j})
(see step 10). Finally, at steps 16–18 for each agent the algorithm divides the sum of her
contributions by the number of performed iterations m. The correctness of the whole
algorithm follows from Theorem 4 in (Liben-Nowell et al., 2012).
Computation Time Analysis. Let n = |N | be the number of agents, and let m be the
required number of iterations. The cost of the algorithm is O(m × n ×margBlock),
where margBlock denotes the cost of computing each marginal contribution (steps
7–11). This requires the computation of an optimal weighted matching in a bipartite
graph, which is feasible in O(n3), via the classical Hungarian algorithm. However, if
the current agent is disconnected from the rest of the coalition, the cost is given by a
simple lookup in the cache where the best allocation for each single agent is stored.
6.2 Sampling Algorithm When the Range of Marginal Contributions Is Known
Maleki et al. (Maleki et al., 2013) propose a bound on the number of samples (over
the population of marginal contributions) required to estimate an agent’s Shapley value,
when the range of his/her contributions is known. Their bound is based on Hoeffding’s
inequality (Hoeffding, 1963), and it states that, in order to approximate the Shapley
value of agent i within an absolute value ǫ, with failure probability at most δi, that is, in
order to get
Prob{|φ˜i − φi| ≥ ǫ} ≤ δi (2)
at leastmi samples are required, where:
mi =
⌈
ln ( 2
δi
) · r2i
2 · ǫ2
⌉
(3)
In the above expression, ri denotes the range of i’s marginal contributions (i.e., ri =
opt({i}) − marg({i}, N)), where N is the set of all agents that partecipate in the
allocation game). This bound allows us to determine the number of required random
samples for each agent i, once ǫ and δi are fixed. Assuming we want an overall failure
probability δ, each agent i ∈ N could be assigned a failure probability δi = δ/|N |. In
principle a higher failure probability δi could be tolerated for agents with larger ranges,
at the expense of lower failure probability for agents with smaller ranges. However, our
experimental tests performed with this variant, exhibited just a few marginal gains.
Once the number of required samples for each agent is determined, the approximate
Shapley value, with the desired guarantees on the absolute error, can easily be computed
by a randomized algorithm evaluating the required samples of coalitions for each player
(see Section 7.1 for a brief description of our parallel implementation).
In order to consider the classical percentage expression for the approximation error,
we should replace ǫ by ǫ · φi in (2). First observe that φi 6= 0 for all agents i that
are considered by the algorithms, because our simplification techniques preliminarily
identify and remove from the game those agents having a null Shapley value (these
agents must be interested only in goods with a null value). In fact, the value of φi that
would appear in (3) may be replaced by any known (non-null) lower bound ℓi ≤ φi,
at the expense of taking more samples than those strictly necessary. On our largest test
instance (namely, the researchers of Sapienza University of Rome who participated in
the research assessment exercise VQR2011-2014), the technique described in Section 5
yields lower bounds that are greater that 0 for all agents. It turns out that, in a matter of
hours, we are able to get approximate Shapley values within 5% of the correct values.
It should be noted that the bound presented by Maleki et al., due to the exponential
relation it establishes between mi and δi, allows us to compute efficiently good ap-
proximate Shapley values, at least on our test instances where the range of the marginal
contributions is fairly limited. For a comparison, the FPRAS approach described in Sec-
tion 6.1 would have taken a few years (instead of the few hours required by the approach
presented here) to process our largest input instance with the same error guarantee (see
Section 7 for details on our experiments).
7 Implementation Details and Experimental Evaluation
7.1 Parallel Implementation of Shapley Value Algorithms
All the algorithms considered in this paper are amenable to parallel implementation.
We engineered our parallel implementations as follows.
FPRAS algorithm (Liben-Nowell et al., 2012). Besides the input allocation game, and
the two parameters δ and ǫ, we added a third parameter, the thread pool size. During
the execution of the algorithm, each thread (there are as many threads as the thread
pool size dictates) is responsible for generating a certain number of permutations ac-
cording to the requested approximation factor and, for each permutation, it computes
the marginal contributions of all authors to that permutation, and saves them to a local
cache. Whenever a thread has generated its assigned number of permutations, it delivers
its local cache of computed scores to a synchronized output acceptor (which increments
the overall score of each author accordingly), and then shuts itself down as its work is
completed. When all threads have shut down, each entry of the acceptor’s output vec-
tor is averaged over the total number of permutations, yielding the final approximate
Shapley vector for that run. The above procedure is repeated for each independent run.
When all runs are done, the component-wise median of all final approximate Shapley
vectors is computed, and the resulting vector is scaled (i.e., all entries are multiplied
by a number such that the budget-balance property is enforced), yielding the desired
approximation with the desired probability.
Algorithm based on the ranges of samples (Maleki et al., 2013). As a preliminary step,
the number of required samples for each author i is determined by a sequential rou-
tine (as this computation is very fast), based on the approximation parameters δ and
ǫ, and on precomputed values for opt({i}), marg({i}, N), where N is the set of all
authors, and LBi. The algorithm also receives two extra parameters, threadPoolSize
and batchSize. Subsequently, each thread (the total number of threads is determined by
threadPoolSize) asks a synchronized producer for a job (i.e., a pair (i, numSamples)).
The synchronized producer either provides a job for the requesting thread, or it returns
null, if enough jobs have already been distributed to satisfy the approximation require-
ments. Upon receiving a job, a thread produces numSamples uniformely distributed
random subsets of N \ {i}, and for each such subset S, computes the marginal contri-
bution of i to S. The sum of these contributions is delivered to a synchronized output
acceptor, which stores, for each author, the sum of all marginal contributions computed
so far by the various threads. Notice that the job provider will always distribute pairs for
which numSamples ≤ batchSize. This is done to ensure, with proper tuning of pa-
rameter batchSize, load balancing between the threads. Finally, when a thread receives
null from the synchronized job provider, it simply shuts itself down, as there is no more
work to do. When all threads have shut down, the output acceptor will average the sum
of all marginal contributions of each author over the number of required samples for
that author, yielding the approximate Shapley value.
Exact algorithm. In our exact algorithm implementation, each thread (the total number
of threads is specified by an input parameter) asks a synchronized producer for a subset
of authors to work with. The synchronized subset producer either provides an n-bit
integer number (where n is the number of authors) for the requesting thread, or it returns
null if all 2n subsets have already been delivered for elaboration. Upon receiving an n-
bit integer from the subset provider, a thread turns it into a subset of authors (if a bit is
set to 1, then the corresponding author is included in the subset), and computes partial
scores for all authors in the subset, storing the values obtained in a local cache. When
a thread receives null from the subset provider, it delivers its local cache of computed
scores to a synchronized output acceptor (which increments the overall score of each
author accordingly), and then shuts itself down, as it has no more work to do. When all
threads have shut down, the output vector will contain the exact Shapley values for all
authors.
7.2 Experimental Results
Hardware and software configuration. Experiments have been performed on two dedi-
cated machines. In particular, sequential implementations were run on a machine with
an Intel Core i7-3770k 3.5 GHz processor, 12 GB (DDR3 1600 MHz) of RAM, and
operating system Linux Debian Jessie. We tested the parallel implementations on a
machine equipped with two Intel Xeon E5-4610 v2 @ 2.30GHz with 8 cores and 16
logical processors each, for a total of 32 logical processors, 128 GB of RAM, and op-
erating system Linux Debian Wheezy. Algorithms were implemented in Java, and the
code was executed on the JDK 1.8.0 05-b13, for the Intel Core i7 machine, and on the
OpenJDK Runtime Environment (IcedTea 2.6.7) (7u111-2.6.7-1 deb7u1), for the Intel
Xeon machine.
Dataset description. We applied the algorithms to the computation of a fair division
of the scores for the researchers of Sapienza University of Rome who participated in
the research assessment exercise VQR2011-2014. Sapienza contributors to the exercise
were 3562 and almost all of them were required to submit 2 publications for review.We
computed the scores of each publication by applying, when available, the bibliographic
assessment tables provided by ANVUR.
Preprocessing.The analysis was carried out by preliminarily simplifying the input using
the properties discussed in Section 4, as explained next.
Starting with a setting with 3562 researchers and 5909 publications, first we re-
moved each researcher having no publications for review. After this step a total of 370
authors were removed. Then, by exploiting the simplification described in Fact 2, we
removed 2323 publications. By using Theorem 3, the graph was subsequently filtered
removing each author whose marginal contribution to the grand coalition coincides with
the optimal allocation restricted to the author himself. After this step 2427 researchers
out of 3562 were removed. Then we divided the resulting agents graph into connected
components obtaining a total number of 156 connected components and we discovered
only two components consisting of more than 10 agents. The sizes of these components
are 691 and 15. Eventually, the components were further simplified by using Fact 4.
After the whole preprocessing phase, we obtained a total of 159 connected components
with the largest one having 685 nodes. The size of the second largest component is just
15 while all the others remain very small (less than 10 nodes). In the rest of the section,
Fig. 3: Methods comparison (n = 15).
we shall illustrate results of experimental activity conducted over the various methods.
To this end, we fixed the value δ = 0.01. This value was chosen heuristically, based on
a series of tests conducted on various CUN Areas of Sapienza, where CUN Areas are
(large) scientific disciplines such as Math and Computer Science (Area 01) or Physics
(Area 02).
Tests with components of variable size. As already pointed out, after the preprocessing
step we obtained very small connected components (less than 10 nodes) except for
the largest two (685 and 15 nodes, respectively). For all components with less than 10
nodes, the exact algorithm, of which we used a sequential implementation for these
tests, performs very well (a few milliseconds), therefore we omit the analysis here. In
order to test all the other algorithms, besides the two largest components, we randomly
extracted samples of (distinct) nodes out of the original graph, to produce different
subgraphs with size n ∈ {23, 26, 30, 40}.
For the considered cases, we do not find significant differences among the values
obtained by using the two approximation algorithms and the exact ones (see, e.g., fig-
ures 3 and 4, in which the approximation algorithms were required to produce results
within 5% of the exact value6). Notably, with the exception of a small number of cases,
our bounds (especially the lower bounds) are always very close to the exact value. In
6 In these two figures the values obtained by FPRAS are not visible because they coincide with
the exact values.
Fig. 4: Methods comparison (n = 40).
particular, for n = 26 we were able to immediately get the Shapley value for all agents,
since upper and lower bounds coincide for all of them.
We also evaluated how many computations of optimal allocations were avoided in
the FPRAS of Liben-Nowell et al., by exploiting Fact 5 (and hence executing in the
latter case Step 10 rather than Step 8 in Algorithm 2). By fixing the approximation error
at ǫ = 0.3, for each n ∈ {15, 23, 26, 30, 40}we get the following savings: 9.65 ·105 out
of 3.5·106 (i.e., 28%), 2.34·106 out of 1.29·107 (18%), 5.36·106 out of 1.87·107 (29%),
8.78 · 106 out of 2.9 · 107 (30%), and 1.46 · 107 out of 6.93 · 107 (21%), respectively.
As already pointed out, the FPRAS method performed much better than its theoret-
ical guarantee on the maximum approximation error. We report the real maximum and
average approximation errors (denoted by X and Y, respectively) of our implementation
w.r.t. the exact algorithm for each n ∈ {15, 23, 26}, with ǫ = 0.3. For n = 15, we get
X = 0.01 and Y = 3 ·10−3, for n = 23 we get X = 1.5 ·10−3 and Y = 1.7 ·10−4, and for
n = 26 we get X = 1.06 · 10−4 and Y = 1.59 · 10−5. In all cases, the maximum approx-
imation error was about 1% (or less) and therefore considerably below the theoretical
guarantee (30%). The algorithm based on the bound ofMaleki et al. also performs better
than its theoretical guarantee, though not by as wide a margin as the FPRAS method (it
is, however, much faster, as we will see in the next paragraph). In this case, for n = 15
we get X = 0.093 and Y = 0.046, for n = 23 we get X = 0.098 and Y = 0.011, and
for n = 26 we get X = 0.097 and Y = 0.019. In all cases, the maximum approximation
error was below 10%, and therefore quite smaller than the required threshold.
Fig. 5: Sequential implementations: running times for the computation of the exact
value by using the brute-force algorithm (green), and of the upper and lower bounds
(blue) vs instance size.
Running Times. Figures 5, 6 and 7 report the computation times of the various algo-
rithms. In particular, Figure 5 focuses on the sequential implementations of the brute-
force algorithm for computing the exact values, and of the algorithms for computing the
upper and lower bounds. For the experiments, we computed separately the two bounds
in order to point out that the computation of the lower bound requires in general more
time, because it considers allocation over larger coalitions than those considered for
the computation of the upper bound. Moreover, as discussed in Section 5, the running
times for computing the bounds heavily depend on the cardinality of the agents’ neigh-
borhoods. This explains why the running times for the case n = 50 are smaller than
those for the case n = 40.
Figure 6 shows the running time of the parallel implementation of the FPRAS
method, using 24 threads, for different values of ǫ. In particular, we performed five trials
over the different (sub)games described above, and report averaged measures. We can
see that for games of reasonable size we can achieve a high theoretical approximation
error guarantee. For instance, for the largest considered game (n = 50) we were able
to compute the approximate Shapley value with ǫ = 0.1 in less than 90 minutes. There
is a big gap between the performances of the FPRAS method, when using the extreme
values we considered for the allowed approximation error. However, as already pointed
out, even when we used a poor theoretical guarantee on the approximation error, we
still obtained a quite reasonable accuracy.
Fig. 6: Parallel implementation of FPRAS method: running times vs ǫ.
Fig. 7: Parallel implementation of Maleki-based algorithm: running times vs ǫabs.
In spite of its excellent accuracy, and its high efficiency when compared to the exact
algorithm, we estimated that our parallel implementation of the FPRAS method would
take, with ǫ = 0.05 and 24 threads, roughly 3.33 years to fully analyze the largest
component of our Sapienza test case, comprising 685 authors. By contrast, the parallel
implementation of the algorithm based on the bound proposed by Maleki et al., with the
same settings, takes only 11.75 hours. The bound on the number of samples proposed by
Maleki et al. requires the knowledge of the range of the marginal contributions, which
was computed in less than 3 minutes. Moreover, in order to guarantee that the results
are within a certain percentage of the correct values, the lower bounds for the Shapley
value are also required. For the biggest component of our test instance, we computed
the lower bounds for the 681 authors with neighborhood size up to 19; for the few
remaining authors with more neighbors (just 4 authors), we used as lower bound the
marginal contribution to the grand coalition. Multithreaded computation of the lower
bounds took approximately 160 hours.
It should be noted that the bound by Maleki et al. could be applied directly to the
largest CC in the unsimplified Sapienza VQR graph. This CC comprises 1176 authors.
In this case, straightforward application of the bound for all authors requires, on our
server, with 24 threads and an absolute error ǫabs = 5, roughly 20.5 hours. If we set
ǫabs = 1, the computation time increases to approximately 31 days. Figure 7 shows
the running times of the parallel implementation of Maleki-based algorithm on the two
largest CCs in our test instances, with varying values for ǫabs.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have identified useful properties that allow us to decompose large
instances of allocation problems into smaller and simpler ones, in order to be able to
compute the Shapley value. The proposed techniques greatly improve the applicabil-
ity to real-world problems of the approximation algorithms described in the literature.
Furthermore, we described an algorithm for the computation of an upper bound and a
lower bound for the Shapley value. These bounds provide a more accurate estimate of
approximation errors, and (often, in our case study) yield the exact Shapley value for
those agents where upper and lower bounds coincide.
We have engineered parallel implementations of the considered algorithms, and we
have tested them on a real-world problem, namely, the 2011-2014 Italian research as-
sessment program (known as VQR), modeled as an allocation game. With the proposed
tools, we have been able to compute, either exactly, or within a fairly good approxi-
mation (5% of the correct value with 99% probability) the Shapley value for all agents
in our largest test instance, namely, Sapienza University of Rome, comprising 3562
researchers and 5909 research products.
As future work, we would like to extend the structure-based technique described
in (Greco et al., 2015) to the more general class of games where more than one good
can be allocated to each agent (as it is the case in VQR allocations). This way, we could
compute efficiently the exact Shapley value for large games, provided that the treewidth
of the agents graph is small. With this respect, we note that this is not the case for the
large Sapienza VQR instance, because after the simplification performed with the tools
described in the paper we are left with a large component whose estimated treewidth is
64. This is too much for using structure-based decomposition techniques. However, for
the sake of completeness, we note that all other components have a low treewidth. For
instance, the component with 50 agents used in our tests has treewidth 5.
Finally, we would like to obtain tighter lower and upper bounds, possibly with a
computational effort that can be tuned to meet given time constraints.
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